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Protecting victims of domestic violence – have we got the balance right? 
 
That States should act to prevent domestic violence and protect victims is clearly 
acknowledged in international law.  Yet international law confirms also that victims, 
perpetrators, and their families have rights to privacy, to a family life and to a home.  The 
extent to which rights to respect for private and family life should be interfered with in order 
to protect victims remains in dispute.   
 
With the aim of improving the protection afforded to domestic violence victims in England 
and Wales, in 2011-2012 the police and courts piloted the use of two new short-term 
protective measures; domestic violence protection notices and orders.  Between 2012 and 
2013 the police also piloted the domestic violence disclosure scheme, which saw prospective 
victims provided with information about their partner’s previous violent behaviour. The 
disclosure scheme and the domestic violence protection orders and notices are to be rolled 
out nationally from March 2014. In this article, consideration is given to the impact these two 
initiatives will have on the privacy of victims and perpetrators, an issue not considered in 
government evaluations of the pilots.  This article analyses whether the rollout of these new 
initiatives is justified, given their potential for interference in private and family life. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Until the nineteenth century, the ideal of family privacy, an ideal central to the philosophy 
underlying the liberal state, largely shielded the family from state intervention. ’
 1
 Whilst in 
England and Wales a marked change in approach has become evident, with significantly 
increased protection now offered to victims of domestic violence, the extent to which the 
state should intervene in private family life to protect such victims continues to provoke 
debate.   
 
Domestic legislative developments affording improved protection to victims can be ascribed 
to various factors: an improved domestic understanding of domestic violence and its effects, 
campaigning by women’s movements and organizations supporting women,
2
 but also by 
numerous international conventions which condemn violence against women.
3
 
 
The difficulty for legislators, of course, is that whilst these international conventions argue 
persuasively that states should act to protect domestic violence victims, certain conventions 
also afford rights to perpetrators of domestic violence, and to the families of victims and 
perpetrators.
4
  These rights, including rights to respect for private and family life, often 
conflict with rights to protection afforded to victims.  
 
 
1
 A Diduck and F Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State – Texts, Cases and Materials (Hart Publishing,,3
rd
 
Edition, 2012) at p547 
2
 A Matczak, E Hatzidimitriadou and J Lindsay, Review of Domestic Violence Policies in England and Wales 
(Kingston University and St Georges, University of London, 2011) 
3
 Including UN, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 20 December 1993 
(GA/RES/48/104); 2011 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence 
4
 For example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
                                                          
It is against this backdrop that this article examines two sets of measures which were rolled 
out across England and Wales in March 2014.  First, we will consider domestic violence 
protection notices (‘DVPNs’) and Domestic Violence Protection Orders (‘DVPOs’).
5
   The 
second initiative we consider is the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (‘the disclosure 
scheme’).   
 
Drawing upon the international literature and jurisprudence which debate the role that the 
state should play in protecting domestic violence victims, outlining how protection afforded 
to domestic violence victims in England and Wales might be improved, this article questions 
whether the introduction of DVPNs, DVPOs and the disclosure scheme is justified.  
 
International obligations 
 
Public authorities in England and Wales must act in accordance with the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the European 
Convention’).
6
  Accordingly courts, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, must take 
positive steps to protect life
7
 and prevent torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.
8
 
Victims of domestic violence may enforce such rights and seek a remedy for their breach at 
the domestic level
9
 and through proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) when all domestic remedies have been exhausted.  The provisions of the European 
Convention may thus be seen as fundamental in the fight against domestic violence.
10
 
 
The European Convention is not, however, the only convention which requires the UK 
Government to act to prevent violence, protect victims and punish perpetrators.  The 1948 
UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
11
 (‘the Universal Declaration’), for example is 
arguably of crucial importance in signalling that no-one should be subjected to torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
12
 that slavery and servitude are not 
to be tolerated,
13
 and that no individual should be permitted to kill another.
14
  Numerous 
further international provisions exist with the specific aim of improving the protection 
afforded to women victims of violence: 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women,
15
 the European Parliament Resolution on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women,
16
 the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the protection of women 
against violence,
17
 and 2011 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (‘The Istanbul Convention’).  This final 
convention is remarkable for its lofty aspiration ‘to create a Europe free from violence 
5
 
5
 DVPO appear to be based upon similar legislative provisions operating elsewhere in Europe; the Austrian 
Protection against Domestic Violence Act 1996 and the German Protection from Violence Act 2002 (ACPO, 
Tackling Perpetrators of violence against women and girls: ACPO Review for the Home Secretary (ACPO, 2009) at 
p 50) 
6
 Section 6 Human Rights Act 1998 
7
 Article 2 European Convention 
8
 Article 3 European Convention 
9
 Section 7 Human Rights Act 1998 
1010
 Shazia Choudhry and Jonathan Herring, Domestic Violence and the Human Rights Act 1998: a new means of 
legal intervention? [2006] PL 752 
11
 GA/RES 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 . 
12
 Article 5 European Convention 
13
 Article 4 European Convention 
14
 Article 3 European Convention 
15
 UN, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 20 December 1993 (GA/RES/48/104) 
16
 26 Nov 2009 
17
 Council of Europe, Rec (2002) 5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the protection of women 
against violence  
                                                          
against women and domestic violence.
18
  It is in many ways also a unique convention, in 
seeking to tackle both gender-based violence and domestic violence suffered by men, older 
relatives and children.
19
 It stands in contrast, therefore, both to the international 
conventions which focus explicitly on violence against women,
20
 and to international 
conventions which afford broad rights to all sections of the public.
21
 The key importance of 
this Convention, compared to many international conventions, is that, once in force, when a 
State ratifies this Convention ‘[p]reventing and combating such violence is no longer a 
matter of goodwill but a legally binding obligation.’
22
 
 
At present it is only the provisions of the European Convention that are directly enforceable 
by victims of domestic violence in England and Wales
23
. Consideration of this particular 
Convention’s role in preventing domestic violence and protecting victims is in any event 
justified when one notes the ECtHR’s strong disapprobation of states which fail to protect 
victims.  (This is not to suggest that the other international provisions are irrelevant.  Indeed, 
in the cases of Bevacqua  and Opuz the ECtHR made clear that even in a case brought under 
the European Convention the ECtHR would have consideration for such other important 
international obligations.
24
) 
 
Before we look at the European Convention provisions which require the state to protect 
victims of domestic violence we must of course acknowledge that this Convention also 
affords certain rights which conflict with these rights to protection.  These conflicting rights 
are best described as rights to freedom from state intervention.  State intervention in the 
domestic violence context might entail: police arrest and removal of a perpetrator of 
violence from the family home; prosecution of that perpetrator; inter-agency information 
sharing to determine how to protect a victim and their family, or the removal of a child from 
that situation. The key focus of this article is the balance that the government must achieve 
between the rights to protection and the right to respect for private life. The balancing of 
rights that is necessitated is, as we will see, undoubtedly difficult to undertake in cases of 
domestic violence.   In order to understand the factors that public authorities must consider, 
we will first explore the protections that are offered to victims of domestic violence through 
Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14.
25
 We will subsequently consider the right to respect for private life, 
and the issue of non-intervention in cases of domestic violence. 
 
Obligations to protect victims 
 
In Osman v United Kingdom
26
 the ECtHR made clear that Article 2 of the European 
Convention imposes an obligation upon the state to protect individuals from threats to their 
18
 Preamble to the Istanbul Convention and Explanatory Notes to the Convention, paragraph 1  
19
 Ibid 
20
 For example the 1993 UN Declaration, the European Parliament Resolution on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women and the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the protection of women against violence  
21
 For example the Universal Declaration and the  European Convention  
22
 http://www.womenlobby.org/news/New-Resources/article/how-to-use-the-council-of-europe accessed 
19/12/2013. At the present time 8 states have ratified the Convention; 10 ratifications are required for the 
Convention to enter into force 
23
 Although the Istanbul Convention will impose legally binding obligations on those who ratify  it the UK 
government has yet to ratify the Convention. The Convention has yet to be ratified by 10 states and is not yet in 
force 
24
 Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria App no: 71127/01 12 June2008 [49-53]; Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28 [72-82].  
25
 Note Article 4, which prohibits slavery and servitude, and Article 5, which affords a right to liberty and security 
of person, might potentially also be relevant to some cases of domestic violence 
26
 Osman v UK (1990) 1 FLR 193; Although Osman does not concern domestic violence its dicta have been cited 
with approval in cases relating to domestic violence, for example Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28 at [128]; 
Kontrova v Slovakia (2007) 4 EHRR 482 at [49] 
                                                          
lives posed by third parties, where ‘the authorities knew or ought to have known … of a real 
and immediate risk to the life’ of that identified individual. In the event that the state 
subsequently fails ‘to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk’ then the state will be considered to 
have breached Article 2
27
.  The recent domestic case of Sarjantson v Chief Constable of 
Humberside Police
28
 takes the above conclusions further; it is not necessary to know the 
specific identify or name of the individual at risk of violence.  ‘The essential question … is 
whether the police knew or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate risk 
to the life of the victim of the violence and whether they did all that could reasonably be 
expected of them to prevent it from materialising’.
29
 In the domestic violence context, 
therefore, if the police fail to take reasonable measures to respond to allegations of 
domestic violence which indicate risk to life,
30
 even if they do not know the specific identify 
of the alleged victim, any resulting death would potentially breach Article 2.  
 
Many of the claims made in domestic violence cases brought before the ECtHR, where the 
severity of the violence is such that an Article 2 claim might not be founded, are based 
alternatively upon Article 3.   
 
‘Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society … 
The obligation on all contracting parties under Article 1 of the ECHR … taken in 
conjunction with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that 
individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals.’
31
 
 
Although the ECtHR has confirmed that ‘ill-treatment’ must attain a minimum level of 
severity to fall within Article 3,
32
 and that Article 3 protection will therefore not apply to all 
cases of domestic violence, ECtHR jurisprudence suggests that treatment which involves 
actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering is likely to be covered by Article 
3.
33
  In light of current understanding that domestic violence encompasses forms of non-
physical abuse, including psychological and emotional abuse, coercion and intimidation,
34
 it 
is important that we recognise the suggestions of Choudhry and Herring that: 
 
‘Treatment which humiliates or debases an individual; shows a lack of respect for, or 
diminishes human dignity; or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable 
of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance may also be characterised 
as degrading and fall within the prohibition of Article 3’, particularly if the object of 
such treatment ‘was to humiliate and debase the person concerned’ and if ‘it 
adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3.’
35
   
27
 Osman v UK (1990) 1 FLR 193 at [116]   
28
 [2013] EWCA Civ 1252 
29
 Sarjantson v Chief Constable of Humberside Police [2013] EWCA Civ 1252 at [25] 
30
 Kontrova v Slovakia [2007] ECHR 419 App 7510/04; the mother made various reports to the police regarding 
her husband’s violence. This violence ultimately resulted in the death of their 2 children.  The ECtHR considered 
her article 2 rights had been breached by the police failing to act 
31
 E v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 31 at [88]  
32
 Ireland v UK(1978) 2 EHRR 25 at [162]  
33
 A v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 61 
34
 Non-physical abuse such as psychological and emotional abuse, coercion and intimidation are now explicitly 
recognised as forms of domestic violence; Home Office, Domestic Violence and Abuse, 
https://www.gov.uk/domestic-violence-and-abuse  
35
 S Choudry and J Herring, Domestic violence and the Human Rights Act 1998: a new means of legal intervention? 
[2006] PL 752 at p759 
                                                          
 Article 8 is the third key European Convention article to impose positive obligations upon the 
state towards the victims of domestic violence.  The ECtHR has contemplated the notion of 
private life which is protected by Article 8 in numerous cases,
36
 making clear that whilst; 
   
the concept of 'private life' is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. 
It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person …  It can … embrace 
multiple aspects of the person's physical and social identity …  … Article 8 protects in 
addition a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world …’
 37
 
 
Article 8 thus implies freedom from interference with an individual’s physical or personal 
space, rights not to be subjected to unwanted contact, rights to be protected from physical 
interferences with one’s body, and thus to be protected from violence. Article 8 is 
additionally recognized to offer protection to interference with one’s mental state.  Where a 
victim of domestic violence suffers physical harm and, as a result of physical or non-physical 
abuse, subsequently suffers emotional and psychological problems which then impair that 
individual’s ability for self-development, Article 8 will undoubtedly be engaged.
38
  
 
Whilst we will shortly consider why some academics contend that respect for a victim’s 
privacy justifies non-intervention or limited state intervention in cases of domestic violence, 
we must certainly recognize that compelling arguments can be made to suggest that state 
intervention is in fact required to protect many aspects of a victim’s private life.
39
 ECtHR 
jurisprudence indeed explicitly states that article 8 imposes positive obligations upon the 
state, which require it to intervene to protect actual and potential victims of such violence.
40
  
 
Whilst, if one considers the international obligations outlined above, it is certainly 
incumbent upon the state to act to prevent domestic violence, to fully understand the 
nature of the state’s obligations to domestic violence victims, particularly female victims, we 
must, however, also consider Article 14.   
 
It is the case of Opuz v Turkey
41
 which highlights the particular importance of Article 14 in 
actions where the state has failed to provide effective protection for female victims of 
violence. Opuz signals clearly that where the attitude of those charged with implementing 
the law (not necessarily the law itself) has resulted in or exacerbated the harm suffered by 
such a victim, the Article 14 prohibition on discrimination may be breached. Opuz thus 
illustrates the ‘more nuanced approach to the role of the state’ regarding domestic violence 
36
 See Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 , Marper v UK [2008] ECHR 1581  
37
 Marper v UK [2008] ECHR 1581 at [66] 
38
 See Choudhry and Herring, Domestic violence and the Human Rights Act 1998: a new means of legal 
intervention?  [2006] PL 752 at 769; Choudhry and Herring, Righting Domestic Violence, (2006] 20 Int’l JL Pol & 
Fam 95 at [98] 
39
 Choudry and  Herring, Domestic violence and the Human Rights Act 1998: a new means of legal intervention?  
[2006] PL 752 at 768-769 
40
 Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria [2008] ECHR 498, app 71127/01 at [64-65] ‘‘While the essential object of Article 8 is 
to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities, there may in addition be positive 
obligations inherent in effective “respect” for private and family life and these obligations may involve the 
adoption of measures in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. Children and other 
vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection… Furthermore, the authorities’ positive 
obligations – in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in 
combination with Article 3 of the Convention – may include, in certain circumstances, a duty to maintain and 
apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private 
individuals.’ 
41
 (2010) 50 EHRR 28 
                                                          
described by Elizabeth Schneider; an approach which recognises the range of institutions 
and extent of culture that may be ‘complicitous in violence’.
42
 Where the police, for 
example, fail to investigate a complaint of domestic violence because it is a ‘family matter’, 
or where a judge fails to afford protection to a woman because he accepts a perpetrator’s 
argument that the violence is justified on the grounds of custom, or honour, a climate 
‘conducive to domestic violence’
43
 may thus be created.  Where the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) discontinue a prosecution because a female victim has withdrawn their 
statement, or where the sanction meted out to a domestic violence perpetrator is 
insufficient to deter repeat offending, allegations of breach of Article 14 alongside one or 
more of the other articles considered above may thus be justified, on the basis of gender-
based discrimination.
44
  
 
Domestic violence continues to be a significant problem in England and Wales, affecting 
both men and women; approximately 1.2 million women experienced domestic violence 
during the survey period, whilst in the same period there were 800,000 male victims.
45
 
Significantly more women are affected by men; women are the victims in more than seven 
out of ten incidents of domestic violence
46
 and ‘… the vast majority of serious and recurring 
violence is perpetuated by men towards women’.
47
 The conclusion that can thus be drawn is 
that the UK government has no room for complacency.  It must be mindful of its substantive 
obligations under Articles 2, 3 and 8 and also under Article 14.  If the UK is to comply with its 
international obligations, it is essential that an effective legal framework is in place to 
protect victims, and that authorities such as the police and the CPS demonstrate clearly that 
domestic violence is not tolerated, and that when they are aware of a risk of violence they 
will act to prevent it, and to punish the perpetrator.  
 
Article 8 reconsidered 
 
The issue that we have, of course, so far largely ignored in our consideration of Article 8, is 
its flip side; the negative obligations imposed upon the state that require it to refrain from 
interference in private and family life.  We have of course moved on significantly from the 
position fifty years ago when domestic violence was not recognized as a legal problem and 
marriage made domestic violence permissible and acceptable.
48
  Nonetheless the Article 8 
right to respect for private and family life is frequently cited as a means to inhibit legal 
intervention in domestic violence cases.
49
   Academics continue to debate the extent to 
which privacy, and the protections afforded by Article 8, justify non-intervention or limited 
42
 Elizabeth Schneider, Engaging with the state about domestic violence: Continuing dilemmas and gender 
equality, (1999-2000) 1 Geo J Gender & L 172 at p177 
43
 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 48 at [198]; Patricia Londono, Developing Human Rights Principles in Cases of 
Gender-based Violence:  Opuz v Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights (2009) HRLR 9(4) 657 
44
 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 48 
45
 Home Office, Statistical News Release: ‘Homicides, fire arm offences and intimate violence 2010/11: 
Supplementary volume 2 to Crime in England and Wales 2010/11, 19 January 2012  
46
 HM Government, Call to end violence against women and girls (TSO, 2010) at p5 
47
 Home Affairs Select Committee, Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage and Honour-based Violence 6
th
 Report of 
2007-08, HC 263-1 (TSO, 2008) at [20] 
48
 Elizabeth Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century: Looking back and Looking 
Forward, (2008-9) 42 Fam LQ 353 
49
 Choudry and Herring, Righting Domestic Violence (2006) 20 IJLPF 20 95; Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 48 at 
[123] the Turkish authorities argued that they ‘could not be expected to separate the applicant and her husband 
and convict the latter while they were living together as a family, as this would amount to a breach of their rights 
under Article 8 of the Convention’ and at [137] ‘The Government claimed that each time the prosecuting 
authorities commenced criminal proceedings … they had to terminate those proceedings … because the 
applicant and her mother withdrew their complaints. In their opinion, any further interference by the authorities 
would have amounted to a breach of the victims’ Article 8 rights’  
                                                          
intervention in the domestic sphere. Until we have a full understanding of the arguments 
relating to both aspects of Article 8 it will not be possible for us to effectively analyse how 
well our current legal framework meets international legal obligations, and more 
importantly to determine whether DVPOs, DVPNs and the Disclosure Scheme are an 
appropriate addition to the English legal framework.   
 
An important initial point to make in any discussion of the contested notion of privacy is that 
much of the literature discussing privacy emanates from across the Atlantic, and is therefore 
at least in part influenced by US jurisprudence, albeit also by the writings of English theorists 
such as Locke and Mills.  This is not to suggest, that the theories about what privacy is or 
does are not valid on this side of the Atlantic.  Rather it is to recognize that in the UK debates 
about privacy are relatively embryonic, at least when compared to debates in the United 
States, which arguably began with the 1890 publication of Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis’s seminal work, ‘The right to privacy’.
50
  Whilst Warren and Brandeis at that time 
depicted privacy as ‘a right to be let alone’, many distinguished academics have 
subsequently developed the concept of privacy, through a multitude of different definitions 
of privacy.  Indeed it has now been suggested that ‘conceptions of privacy typically fall into 
one of six categories or combinations of the six.  … 1) the right to be let alone; 2)limited 
access to the self; 3) secrecy; 4) control of personal information; 5) personhood; 6) intimacy 
… and 7) privacy as a cluster concept.’
51
  Whilst none of these conceptions has gone without 
criticism, the author’s does not intend to explore these criticisms here. Rather, a brief 
overview is provided of three key components of the concept of particular relevance in the 
domestic violence context.     
 
The first component, considered to be at the core of the liberal conception of privacy is the 
notion of inaccessibility, whether that be inaccessibility of our possessions, our body, our 
name, our reputation or our information.
52
  This notion that our body and our information, 
should be inaccessible to others is clearly reflected in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.
53
 Within 
the UK the developing action for misuse of private information equally reflects an 
expectation of inaccessibility to private information
54
.  The important point for this author, 
therefore, is that if privacy encompasses the ability to control dissemination of one’s 
information
55
 then the right to respect for private life is clearly engaged when information is 
disclosed under the Disclosure Scheme.   
 
The second element of privacy, the essence of the right, is that it protects close personal 
relationships.
56
 Privacy is ‘one of the preconditions of intimate relations’.
57
  The fact that 
Article 8 protects ‘the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings’
58
 might certainly be used as an argument against various forms of state intervention 
in domestic violence cases: state mandatory arrest and prosecution policies; disclosure 
50
 S Warren and L Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, (1890) Harv L Rev Vol. IV  No. 5 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/Privacy_brand_warr2.html   
51
 R Kemp and A Moore, Privacy, (2007) Library Hi Tech 5 (1) 58 at 63, drawing on the earlier analysis of D Solove 
(2002) Conceptualising Privacy CLR 90. Note, however, that suggestions privacy can simply be defined as one of 
six concepts, or a cluster of several fail to acknowledge that many academics contend that there is no such thing 
as privacy as a distinct phenomenon in its own right (the eliminativists); David Matheson, A distributive 
reductionism about the right to privacy, (2008) The Monist 91 (1)108 
52
 A Allen, Coercing privacy  (1998-1999) 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 723-757  
53
 See Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1; Marper v UK [2008] ECHR 1581 
54
 See Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22 
55
 As suggested by Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1  
56
 Wood v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414 at [19] 
57
Scott Anderson, Privacy without the right to privacy  (2008)The Monist 91 (1) 81 at p83 
58
 Marper v UK [2008] ECHR 1581 [66] 
                                                          
schemes which allow perpetrators’ private information to be shared with potential victims; 
and the making of court orders which prevent perpetrators from contacting their partners, 
or entering their home.  
 
Finally, privacy is viewed by many as ‘a means to affirm one’s ability to be a moral agent’ or 
as the autonomy or freedom to engage in one’s own thoughts, decisions and actions. 
Certainly, this is again an important issue in the domestic violence context, particularly when 
the state effectively takes the decision to prosecute or to obtain a protective order out of 
the victim’s hands.   
 
Privacy: a shield against state interference or the legitimization of violence? 
 
There are many feminists who, particularly in the US, stress the importance of protecting 
women’s privacy, both privacy in the sense of the right to be let alone
59
 and privacy in the 
sense of decisional privacy, the ability to exercise control over decisions about one’s life.
60
  It 
is from such feminists that we hear suggestions that certain responses to domestic violence, 
particularly mandatory criminal justice interventions, disenfranchise abuse victims,
61
 and 
pose particular problems ‘for poor women and women of colour who are less likely to see 
state intervention as helpful to them and their communities.’
62
 These writers contend that 
the law should offer a range of remedies, and the necessary support to enable women to 
decide what remedies are best for them.
63
 These academics ultimately argue that the law 
should afford women
64
 greater decisional privacy, allowing them to decide ’whether and to 
what extent the abuse should become a matter for public concern…;’
65
 women should be 
allowed ‘to choose whether to continue with or end their intimate relationships’. …‘women 
should not be compelled to testify against their wishes and … third party applications should 
not be made possible without the victim’s consent.’
66
 These issues are all pertinent to our 
discussion of DVPNs and DVPOs. 
 
In stark contrast, other feminist scholars, argue strongly for state intervention in the private 
family sphere, in order to protect victims.  These feminists argue that the state must make 
decisions for victims because domestic violence impairs their rational decision-making 
ability.
67
 They contend that privacy (freedom from state interference) does not benefit 
victims; it instead protects only the autonomy of the abuser at the expense of the victim or 
children.
68
  They claim that proponents of privacy have ‘tended to overlook the risks of harm 
that privacy poses,’ and have failed to recognize that ‘the private sphere of home and family 
59
 Hulse Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court (2009-10) 16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 237-289 at p246 
60
 S Kim, Reconstructing family privacy (2005-6) 57 Hastings L.J 557-600 at p581 
61
 Hulse, Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court (2009-2010)16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 237-289 at p248 
62
 Elizabeth M Schneider, Engaging with the state about domestic violence: Continuing dilemmas and gender 
equality, (1999-2000) 1 Geo J Gender & L 173 
63
 Linda G Mills, Killing her softly: Intimate abuse and the violence of state intervention (1999) 113 Harv L Rev 550-
613 at p612.  As we will see shortly the introduction of DVPNs adds a new short term measure to the existing 
range of remedies and if accompanied by appropriate support DVPNs and DVPOs may provide what some 
women want and need. 
64
 Since domestic violence affects men and women references to ‘women’ might alternatively be read as 
‘domestic violence victims’ 
65
 Alison Diduck and Felicity Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State – Texts, Cases and Materials (Hart 
Publishing, 3
rd
 Edition, 2012) at p608 citing E Stanko Should I Stay or Should I Go? Some Thoughts on the Variants 
of Intimate Violence (1997) 3 Violence Against Women 629 
66
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is a site of peril and subordination,’
69
 They perceive privacy as permitting, encouraging and 
legitimising violence against women.
70
  A stance of non-intervention is particularly 
condemned for the threat that it may pose to children.
71
   
 
Since valid arguments are undoubtedly raised by proponents for and against maintaining 
privacy in cases of domestic violence, it is perhaps inevitable that disagreements about the 
state’s role continue.  It seems, however, that even proponents of privacy accept that a 
private sphere entirely free of state interference is an ‘impossible ideal.’
 72  
Indeed, neither 
the right to respect for private life afforded by Article 8 nor the right to privacy afforded by 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration is unqualified.  Article 12 refers to the right not to be 
subjected to ‘arbitrary interference’.  Interference with Article 8 of the European Convention 
is permissible in prescribed circumstances, including where necessary to prevent disorder or 
crime, to protect health or morals, or to protect the rights and freedoms of others.  Perhaps 
most importantly, both the Universal Declaration and the European Convention require the 
state to intervene in certain circumstances, for example in order to protect the (absolute) 
right to life.   
 
Shazia Choudhry and Jonathan Herring certainly suggest¸ that the need for the state to 
interfere with the right to respect for private life is particularly evident when one considers 
that Article 3 is an absolute right and that there are therefore ‘no circumstances in which it 
is permissible for the state to infringe this right.
 73
  It is their argument that ‘the rights of 
another party [such as the perpetrator] cannot justify an infringement of someone’s article 3 
rights’,
 74
 and indeed it is hard to disagree with the view that the perpetrator’s qualified 
rights should not be allowed to trump the victim’s absolute rights.   
 
Where some might disagree with Choudhry and Herring, however, is in relation to their 
comments ‘that other rights of the victim cannot justify an infringement of article 3’
75
 and 
that ‘it cannot be successfully argued that a family’s right of privacy justifies non-
intervention by the state if that non-intervention is an infringement of one family member’s 
article 3 rights .’ 
 
The difficulty, this author suggests, arises when the victim’s own qualified right to non-
intervention conflicts with her absolute rights to protection.  Must the state always 
intervene, whether the circumstances?  
 
A similar question arises even when a domestic violence case does not reach the level of 
severity that is required for Article 3, but instead engages Article 8.  Article 8, by both 
providing a right to be protected from domestic violence and the right to freedom from 
state interference undoubtedly imposes a difficult burden upon the state. The state must in 
each case weigh up the different elements of the right to privacy. It must balance the 
victim’s rights to protection and to freedom from interference one against the other whilst 
also balancing the victim’s rights against the rights of others, including the perpetrator.   
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According to Choudhry and Herring, the answer, where conflicts arise between the victim’s 
rights, is, to intervene.  Certainly, in a domestic violence case the state cannot justify its 
failure to protect a victim’s article 3 rights by referring to that person’s right to respect for 
private life.’
 76
 What though of the situation, where the victim does not seek protection from 
the state, but in fact objects to state intervention?    
 
The EctHR is itself, not ignorant to these debates about how and whether states should 
intervene in cases of domestic violence when a victim is not supportive of state action, 
acknowledging a lack of ‘consensus among State Parties regarding the pursuance of the 
criminal prosecution against perpetrators of domestic violence when the victim withdraws 
her complaints.’
77
  What the EctHR makes clear in Opuz, however, is that to simply treat a 
case of domestic violence as a private matter is not an option.
78
  Authorities should seek to 
‘strike a balance between a victim’s Article 2, Article 3 or Article 8 rights in deciding on a 
course of action.’
79
  In determining whether intervention, for example in the form of a 
prosecution unsupported by the victim, should proceed, certain factors should be 
considered:  the seriousness of the allegation, the nature of the injuries, whether a weapon 
was used, whether threats are continuing, premeditation, the effects on children of the 
household, whether a threat to the health of the victim or others is ongoing, the current and 
historical state of the relationship between the victim and perpetrator, and the 
perpetrator’s criminal record.
80
   
 
On the basis of the EctHR’s ruling in Opuz, therefore, it seems that there may be instances 
when it might be appropriate for the state to limit its interference, where such interference 
is contrary to the victim’s wishes.  The issue, as in so many cases relating to European 
Convention rights, will be one of proportionality. Ideally, the state should provide a range of 
alternative means by which to protect domestic violence victims, together with the support 
that victims need to enable them to effectively determine the best option for them.  As we 
will see in our next section, the English law does currently afford a range of remedies to 
domestic violence victims.  These are not, however, all without criticism. The issue that we 
will consider shortly, therefore, is how the new measures might improve the protection 
offered to domestic violence victims, and indeed whether they might help the state strike 
the necessary balance between Articles 2, 3 and 8. 
 
The current English law 
 
It is primarily through the civil law that domestic violence victims receive protection; usually 
by obtaining either a non-molestation order and/or an occupation order.   
 
A non-molestation order (‘NMO’) will prohibit an individual from molesting another 
individual with whom they are associated, or from molesting a relevant child.
81
  There are 
now relatively few domestic violence victims who fall outside the definition of associated 
persons.
82
 Furthermore, since it is accepted that molestation ‘covers a wide range of 
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behaviour …’, and encompasses ‘but is wider than violence’,
 83  
 an NMO is a valuable order 
that can be used to prohibit a wide range of behaviours which demonstrate the 
respondent’s intent to cause distress or harm to the victim.
84
   
 
By contrast to the non-molestation order, an occupation order (’OO’) does not prohibit 
violence; rather OOs are sought to regulate occupation of the family home (to exclude a 
violent individual from the home or a defined area around the property and/or to ensure the 
victim can remain in the home whilst the order is in force).  Whilst an OO may afford 
substantial protection to a domestic violence victim, not all victims will be able to benefit 
from such orders, when they most need them.  First, only limited categories of individuals 
can apply for an OO.
85
  Second, research suggests that the courts have been unwilling to 
grant without notice OOs.  
 
Perhaps the most significant problem for the victim who seeks either an NMO or OO, 
however, is that they must apply personally to court. Legal costs and a lack of legal aid can 
be a significant barrier to obtaining an order.
86
  A potential remedy does exist at Section 60 
FLA, a provision which permits a third party to apply for a remedy on the victim’s behalf. 
However, unlike Section 63C FLA which permits a third party
87
 to apply for a forced marriage 
protection order, Section 60 has not been implemented.   Of course, the use of Section 60 
could be seen as overly paternalistic and, if one believes that it should be the victim’s choice 
whether an order is sought, also an interference with victim autonomy.  If a third party were 
to seek a non-molestation order on the victim’s behalf, however, more applications might 
proceed to fruition (at least where third party evidence is available to support the 
application) not least because the victim’s feelings of guilt and fear of reprisals from the 
perpetrator would potentially be alleviated.
88
  More victims might thus be protected. 
 
Where the criminal law, instead of the civil law, is used to prosecute the perpetrator of 
domestic violence,
89
 decision-making is almost entirely removed from the victim’s hands.   
The victim is not party to the proceedings.  They may provide a victim personal statement 
commenting upon matters such as bail, intimidation and how the violence has affected 
them; they may choose to give evidence in support of their allegations of domestic violence.  
It is, however, the police’s decision whether to arrest a perpetrator or to investigate an 
allegation of violence. It is the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who decide whether 
prosecution is in the public interest, and thus whether the state will seek to punish the 
perpetrator.      
 
Key factors for the CPS when it decides whether to pursue a prosecution include the victim’s 
willingness to engage in the criminal process and the nature of the victim’s relationship with 
83
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the perpetrator.
 90
  Such willingness to engage in the process will itself be influenced by 
various factors, including intimidation by the perpetrator and the provision or lack of 
provision of support and protection for the victim themselves.
91
 Crucially, ‘research indicates 
that from a victim’s perspective, the ability of the [criminal justice system] to provide safety 
is key to the decision about ‘staying in’ or ‘dropping out’ of the system’
92
 (and thus also to 
the state punishing the perpetrator, and potentially preventing further violence). For the 
victim, however, such safety is not guaranteed; unless the victim seeks and obtains 
protection through the civil courts they are largely reliant upon the police and the courts to 
ensure they are safe whilst criminal proceedings progress.  Whilst one might imagine that 
bail conditions, for example conditions not to contact a victim, would be an effective means 
by which to afford victim safety, Mandy Burton has suggested that ‘the protection offered to 
victims of domestic violence through bail conditions must … be questioned.’
93
     
 
Domestic violence protection orders and notices 
 
At present, it seems that the legal framework for protecting victims of domestic violence, 
punishing perpetrators and preventing further violence, could be improved.  One particular 
situation where domestic violence victims face significant risks is when the police attend a 
domestic violence incident but do not subsequently remand the perpetrator in custody.  Civil 
injunctions will not always be readily, immediately available
94
, yet research highlights; 
 
‘this is a time of increased risk to a victim.  Where a risk assessment is undertaken it 
is frequently deemed necessary for the victim to consider leaving the address (with 
dependants where applicable) and/or for an injunction to be sought to prevent 
further abuse or harassment.…  Leaving home can have a negative impact on the 
victim’s well-being and causes disruption to the victim’s children and could well be 
another factor in the prosecution attrition rate.’
95
  
 
It is in response to this shortcoming that the provisions of Sections 24-30 of the Crime and 
Security Act 2010 were piloted in three police force areas in 2011 -2012.  Their roll out 
nationwide was subsequently recommended,
96
 and DVPNs and DVPOs are available 
nationally from March 2014.  
 
The evaluation of the pilots (‘the evaluation’) certainly seems to offer some support for 
wider roll out of DVPNs and DVPOs. DVPOs were viewed positively by practitioners as a 
welcome addition to existing responses.  The majority of victim-survivors who benefited 
90
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from a DVPO considered DVPOs to be useful.  They felt they made them safer.
97
 The 
qualified conclusions of the evaluation are that DVPOs were effective in reducing domestic 
violence and abuse,
98
 and that, particularly in cases where the police had been called out on 
three or more occasions, DVPOs resulted in reduced re-victimisation (or at least a reduction 
in further police call outs).
99
 The evaluation thus reflects the positive findings relating to 
similar schemes overseas
100
.     
 
These measures were also welcomed, pre-pilot, as ‘potentially human rights enhancing 
measures.’
101
   As we consider below, however, these measures, will also interfere with 
victims’ and perpetrators’ human rights.
102
 Although questions were asked, pre-pilot, about 
how victims’ and children’s rights to protection would be balanced with competing rights to 
home, private and family life,
103
 the current government guidance on implementing DVPNS 
and DVPOs provides no advice on how such a balance should be achieved.  The issue of how 
DVPNs and DVPOs impact upon victims’ and perpetrators’ rights was largely disregarded in 
the evaluation (whilst the evaluation remarks on the absence of challenges to orders on 
human rights grounds, no consideration is given to how the police and courts undertook the 
human rights balancing exercise, or whether perpetrators wished to, but were unable to 
bring such challenges). Unfortunately, human rights issues again appear to be have been 
ignored in the DVPO impact assessment,
104
 perhaps understandably given the lack of 
consideration of human rights in the evaluation.  It is suggested, here, however, that the 
human rights implications of DVPNs and DVPOs cannot be ignored. 
 
A DVPN is essentially a written notice, personally served by the police upon the alleged 
perpetrator (‘P’), which states why it has been issued, what is prohibited and the 
consequences of breach.  It must state that P is prohibited from molesting the victim (‘V’).  It 
may also include provisions similar to those found in OOs, which ensure V can continue to 
occupy the family home and which regulate P’s rights to enter and occupy the property and 
its environs.  
 
The benefits of a DVPN can be seen immediately; the fact that P is forbidden from molesting 
V, that P may also be told to leave the home and area, potentially offer V immediate 
protection and respite from violence.   It is equally evident, however, that a DVPN, 
particularly a DVPN which restrains P from entering the family home, will impact upon P’s 
ability to maintain his relationship with V and any children and will prevent P from being 
able to choose where and with whom to live.  It thus affects his private and his family life. 
 
The legislation currently envisages that a DVPN will last for 48 hours maximum, with an 
application for a DVPO being made during that period.  This short time period seems 
sensible when one considers that the threshold for granting a DVPN is relatively low, the 
97
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DVPN is granted not by a court but by a police officer,
105
 and there may be potentially 
significant impacts upon V, P and other family members. This view was apparently shared by 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights, who considered the short duration of DVPNs as one 
of several safeguards likely to assist in ensuring a proportionate balance between competing 
rights.  Indeed, upon that basis the Joint Committee Rights concluded the DVPN provisions 
did ‘not pose a significant risk of incompatibility with either the right to respect for home, 
family and private life or the right to respect for the peaceful enjoyment of possessions’.
106
   
 
Unfortunately, however, this safeguard cannot be guaranteed going forward.  First, the 
evaluation recommends considering extending the length of a DVPN to between 4 and 7 
days.
107
 Second, and of greater concern, a DVPN may already, in some circumstances, last 
significantly longer than even 7 days.  Provided that an application is made to the court for a 
DVPO within 48 hours of the DVPN being made, the DVPN then remains in force until the 
court determines the DVPO application. If the magistrates adjourn the DVPO hearing (as 
they are entitled to do) this means that P ‘can remain excluded from his home until the end 
of the adjournment with no criminal charge and no finding of fact by a court.’
108
  The impact 
upon P’s Article 8 rights in such circumstances would be significant.  Indeed, the Joint 
Committee made clear that ‘[t]he longer that a DVPN remains in force without full 
consideration of the case by an independent and impartial tribunal, the greater the risk that 
a longer eviction from the home coupled with a lack of judicial oversight could be 
disproportionate and in breach of the right to respect for private life and potentially, the 
right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.’
109
    
 
This is one of the reasons why it is so important that care is taken by the authorizing officer 
(‘AO’) who grants the DVPN, to ensure that not only are the statutory grounds for a DVPN 
satisfied, but that the appropriate balancing of human rights is undertaken. 
 
The AO  must be satisfied before granting a DVPN that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing P has been violent to or has threatened violence to V, that V is an associated 
person (as defined under the FLA 1996) and that the notice is necessary to protect V from 
violence or a threat of violence.
110
   Unfortunately neither the statute nor the guidance 
define the term ‘violence’. The protection offered to victims will depend greatly upon 
whether violence is defined to mean physical violence,
111
 or whether a more expansive 
definition is adopted encompassing both physical and non-physical forms of abuse.
112
  The 
evaluation sheds no light on how the term was interpreted, and indeed fails to identify the 
lack of definition as a problem.  It is suggested, however, that this issue should be addressed 
within government guidance, to ensure the police and courts do use the wider definition, 
encompassing both the physical and non-physical elements of harm which engage Articles 3 
and 8.  
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Before issuing a DVPN the AO must also consider other matters: the welfare of any children; 
representations by P; the opinion of anyone other than V who lives in the premises from 
which P would be excluded; and the wishes of V.
113
  They must consider: what the DVPN will 
achieve and whether that aim could be achieved by less disruptive means such as bail 
conditions; whether the risk of harm is too great to allow P to return to the home; and 
whether the removal and exclusion of P is the only option to reduce the threat or risk of 
violence.  There are clear echoes in this guidance of the doctrine of proportionality inherent 
in ECtHR jurisprudence, as is appropriate given the potential for interference with P’s and V’s 
home and family life.  It is also appropriate that the views of both V and P are considered.  
 
It is important to note, however, that despite oblique references to the rights of V, P and 
other family members, the guidance provides no detail of V’s rights under Articles 2, 3 and 8, 
nor P’s Article 8 rights, nor the application of these rights.
114
  Indeed the only reference to 
Article 3 relates to P, and the risk that P’s Article 3 rights may be breached if the DVPN 
removes P from their home and that removal (perhaps because they are mentally ill or have 
a learning disability) results in them suffering inhumane or degrading treatment, for example 
because they lack adequate shelter, food, water or basic hygiene facilities.
115
 It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that questions have been raised about whether the AO will be able 
to effectively conduct the human rights balancing exercise.
116
  Whilst the DVPN itself lasts 
only 48 hours, and is accordingly of an interim nature, it is no less important that the 
balancing exercise is appropriately undertaken at that stage.  As Crompton notes ‘the 
damage of unfairly removing a suspect from his home is not easily redressed nor is the 
stigma of labelling him an abuser when there is insufficient evidence to arrest him and there 
have been no findings by a civil court.’
117
 The ‘long lasting or permanent effects’ of such 
interim decisions cannot be ignored.
118
 
 
Once a DVPN has been issued, as noted earlier, the guidance envisages that the police will 
automatically apply to a specialist domestic violence court, or the magistrates’ court for a 
DVPO.  The court may make a DVPO if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the 
grounds, which mirror the grounds for the DVPN, are met.  This DVPO will last for at least 14 
days but no more than 28.
119
 It must prohibit molestation. It may include provisions 
regulating occupation and use of the family home.
120
   
 
It is when the DVPO is granted, particularly when exclusion requirements are attached, that 
the most significant incursion into V and P’s rights will undoubtedly be felt. The Joint 
Committee were clearly not convinced that a DVPO was needed, noting; 
 
‘The DVPO lasts for a significantly longer time-frame and has the potential to impact 
significantly on the home, family and private life of both the victim and the suspect. 
… the Government does not appear to have provided evidence for the need for a 
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“Go” order which lasts for up to a month. We note that the time-frame for these 
orders in other jurisdictions appears to be much shorter.’
121
  
 
Indeed the Joint Committee had such concerns about DVPOs that they suggested the 
Government should provide further evidence that such a measure was appropriate, 
particularly given the availability of alternative civil law protection.
122
  Despite these 
comments the Government chose to proceed with the 28 day DVPO. 78% of the 414 DVPOs 
made during the pilots were imposed for the full 28 days.
123
 Furthermore, more than two-
thirds (69%) included restrictions from entering the home or coming near the victim.   
 
These statistics might not cause such concern, if there were evidence to indicate that 
magistrates, when making DVPOs, had balanced the respective rights of V and P.  In fact 
statistics indicate that the emphasis may have been on protecting V.  Certainly it seems far 
easier to obtain a DVPO than an OO.  Whilst it is settled jurisprudence that an OO is a 
draconian remedy, which should be used only in exceptional circumstances,
124
 DVPOs were 
made in 89% of cases (and in 69% of these cases with exclusion requirements attached).  
This can perhaps be explained by the less stringent statutory test which applies to DVPO 
applications, and the lack of an explicit balancing requirement.  It undoubtedly, however, 
raises questions about whether courts are considering the rights of both V and P when 
making DVPO applications.
125
     
 
Questions also remain to be answered about how V’s rights to protection and V’s rights to 
privacy or autonomy have been balanced.  Whilst the magistrates must consider V’s opinion 
before making an order,
126
 it is clear that the Government intended it to be possible for 
DVPOs to be obtained even if V did not support the proceedings.
127
Although it seems that 
some DVPOs may have been refused because of victim opposition,
128
 the evaluation 
provides insufficient information to confirm to what extent victims views are influencing the 
police and the courts.
129
   
 
In any event, it is suggested that more advice could be provided to practitioners about V’s 
rights, the balance to be achieved between V’s protection and autonomy, and the benefits 
of listening to and working with V.  Certainly, Mills has suggested that ‘battered women are 
safest … and feel most respected – when they willingly partner with state actors … a 
battered woman needs a healing response to the intimate abuse, one that nurtures her 
strengths and empowers her to act.’
130
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 More advice could also be provided about how these remedies can be used alongside 
existing protective remedies.  Previously a short term remedy of this type (civil in nature, 
applied for by a third party) has been lacking.  However, in the immediate aftermath of a 
domestic violence incident one can see advantages in a short term notice which gives both 
parties breathing space and can be used to calm a situation down.  This alternative to 
existing protective remedies may meet the needs of women who fear the criminal justice 
system, who cannot access civil protection themselves and/or who wish their relationship to 
continue.
131
  It is arguable that the DVPN and DVPO may help also those victims who seek 
longer term protection, provided that these victims also receive support from appropriate 
services.  
 
The Government appear to have envisaged that DVPOs would be used to provide safety 
while victims sought longer term protection through NMOs and OOs
132
. Evaluations of 
overseas initiatives suggest such notices and orders ‘can be very effective if victims also 
receive immediate help and support from specialist domestic violence services, to ensure 
that effective safety planning and longer term support and protection is put in place.’
133
  
One can thus envisage real potential for DVPNs and DVPOs to improve the circumstances of 
victims of violence.
134
 Unfortunately, however, the key to these provisions seems to be 
support, support to help a victim decide whether to apply for an NMO or to support a 
criminal prosecution, and disappointingly the evaluation indicates that referrals were made 
to support services in only 60.9% of DVPO cases.
135
  If a victim cannot obtain support to 
obtain longer term protection whilst protected by the DVPO, then the benefits of the DVPO 
appear significantly limited.  Concerns have already been noted about whether the intrusion 
into P’s rights resulting from a DVPO is justified, particularly if the balancing of V and P’s 
rights is not seen to be undertaken.  If a victim will not be able to use a DVPO to protect 
herself in the longer term, then one must certainly ask whether removing the perpetrator 
from the home for 28 days can be justified as necessary and proportionate. 
 
Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme  
 
The second of the Government’s initiatives differs markedly different from the first.  In stark 
contrast to existing legal remedies and to the DVPNs and DVPOs (which are broadly used 
either to protect victims of violence or to punish perpetrators) the Disclosure Scheme is 
designed to help victims avoid or leave relationships which might put them at risk of 
domestic violence.    
 
The aim of the Disclosure Scheme is to enable someone (V) who is in a relationship with a 
previously violent individual (P) to obtain the information that they need to make informed 
131
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choices about whether and how V takes forward that relationship.
136
 Such information will 
be made available to V under one of two new disclosure processes.  Under the right to ask 
process it will be V, or a third party upon V’s behalf, who will ask for information about P.   
Under the right to know process V will be contacted by the police or a partner agency and 
provided with information about P’s history of violence (even when V has not sought such 
information).  
 
Whichever disclosure route is used, before any disclosure is made, minimum checks will be 
made of the Police National computer, the Violent and Sexual Offenders Registers (if 
relevant) and local intelligence systems.  Where checks indicate V faces an immediate risk of 
harm then the police must take immediate safeguarding action.  In all other cases any 
decision to act, including decisions to disclose will be taken following discussion with other 
safeguarding agencies, ideally the relevant Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference 
(MARAC). That inter-agency information sharing is crucial to determining risks posed to V 
and to the wider community is emphasised throughout the guidance. It is ultimately the 
local decision-making forum rather than the police which will determine whether a 
disclosure should be made, although police information will form the majority of the 
information disclosed.   
 
The Disclosure Scheme, similarly to the DVPNs and DVPOs was initially piloted.  During the 
14 month pilot period 231 right to ask requests for information were received; 59 
disclosures made.  Under the right to know scheme 155 right to know requests were 
initiated by the police; 52 disclosures were made.  The disclosure rate was relatively low 
(29%) with primary reasons for non-disclosure being insufficient information suggesting a 
risk was posed to V, absence of a pressing need to disclose, or a failure to meet the scheme 
criteria.  Disappointingly, before decisions were taken roll the disclosure scheme out 
nationally, there was no evaluation of the scheme’s effectiveness, nor any assessment of the 
scheme’s impact on victims and perpetrators.  Instead the assessment which was 
undertaken focused on capturing views of the disclosure process both from individuals who 
had received disclosures and those involved in determining whether disclosures should be 
made.137 Whilst individuals whose information was disclosed may have suffered significant 
interference with their rights, their views were not considered.  
 
The purpose of this section is, therefore, again to explore the potential impact of the scheme 
upon human rights.  The first thing to note in this regard is that whilst the clear aim of the 
Disclosure Scheme is to improve victim protection,
138
 what is interesting about this scheme, 
is the fact that it has also been lauded as a means to ‘empower women’, by enabling them 
to ‘make informed choices’ about whether they continue their relationship. Whilst there will 
undoubtedly be some interference with V’s private life
139
 when a disclosure is made under 
the right to know scheme, it is not interference with V’s right to private life that causes most 
concern. It is the balance between the V’s rights to protection and P’s Article 8 rights that is 
our focus.    
 
We should recall that the UK courts have, in interpreting Article 8, determined that ‘the law 
now focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity—‘the right to control the 
dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the esteem and 
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respect of other people.’
140
 Disclosure of P’s information to V and to other agencies thus 
undoubtedly engages Article 8.
141
   
 
That Article 8 is engaged is, of course, not the end of the matter.  Although ‘an individual's 
personal autonomy … should make him – master of all those facts about his own identity … 
and also of the "zone of interaction" … between himself and others….his control of them can 
… be loosened, abrogated, if the State shows an objective justification for doing so.’
142
 The 
domestic courts have confirmed indeed, in R (Wood) v Commissioner of the Metropolis, that 
Article 8  
 
‘should not be read so widely that its claims become unreal and unreasonable.  
…‘First, the alleged threat or assault to the individual's personal autonomy must (if 
Article 8 is to be engaged) attain "a certain level of seriousness". Secondly, the 
touchstone for Article 8(1)'s engagement is whether the claimant enjoys on the facts 
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" … Thirdly, the breadth of Article 8(1) may in 
many instances be greatly curtailed by the scope of the justifications available to the 
State pursuant to Article 8(2).’
143
 
 
Reading the Disclosure Scheme guidance
144
 it is clear that vast quantities of information 
about P may be disclosed.  Disclosures will not only include information about unspent 
convictions for ‘domestic’ violence (as one might expect), but information may also be 
disclosed about offences which one might not ordinarily relate to domestic violence: 
burglary, affray, possession of a firearm, theft, robbery, cruelty to children, arson, people 
trafficking and offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Even if a conviction has not 
been obtained, allegations of offending may still be disclosed, provided disclosure is deemed 
necessary to protect V.   Third party reports of suspected violence, or even malicious 
allegations made by a former partner might be disclosed.  Where it is considered that P 
should not be told of proposed disclosures, in order to protect V, P will have no opportunity 
to put forward their own version of events.
145
   
 
The invasion into P’s privacy is potentially significant; when P’s information is disclosed this 
interferes both with P’s right to control his information and his right to form relationships.  
The first of the tests in Wood is therefore satisfied.  The guidance acknowledges that 
information about a person’s previous convictions and police intelligence relating to them is 
confidential.  P would thus be expected to have a reasonable expectation of privacy; the 
second test is also satisfied.  The key question, therefore, is whether it is justified to 
interfere with P’s right to private life by disclosing information to V because P has been 
convicted of, or is suspected of having committed a domestic violence-related offence.    
 
The jurisprudence law certainly suggests there are instances where disclosure of an 
offender’s information may be justified in order to protect the public. The leading case of R v 
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police and Others, Ex parte Thorpe and Another,
146
 for 
example confirms that: 
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 ‘if the police have information about an individual  ‘which it would be damaging to 
that individual to disclose, and which should not be disclosed without some public 
justification’ the police may nonetheless ‘consider in the exercise of a careful and 
bona fide judgment that it is desirable or necessary in the public interest to make 
disclosure, whether for the purpose of preventing crime or alerting members of the 
public to an apprehended danger’ and in such a case it would not be improper ‘for 
them to make such limited disclosure as is judged necessary to achieve that 
purpose.’ 
 
Such jurisprudence clearly underpins the Government guidance, which refers extensively to 
the need to consider disclosure on a case by case basis, taking account of statutory and 
common law disclosure powers, the common law duty of confidence, Article 8 of the 
European Convention, the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 
1974.   It is unfortunate, however, that despite recognizing that legal protections are 
afforded to the perpetrator, the guidance does not provide sufficient information to enable 
practitioners to effectively balance the competing rights of V and P.  There is a lack of clarity 
in the Guidance as to exactly why the duty of confidence, Data Protection Act 1998 and 
Article 8 apply, and a commensurately weak explanation of the considerations that apply 
under those provisions.   Whilst the guidance does detail a three stage test to be satisfied 
before disclosures are made,
147
 the pilot assessment indicates that practitioners have 
struggled to apply this test and particularly to understand what is meant by the key term 
‘pressing need to disclose’.
148
 The pilot assessment discovered clear differences in how 
individual professionals interpreted and understood the term,
149
 differences which may have 
resulted in variations in disclosure rates between pilot areas. One practitioner suggested 
that ‘pressing need to disclose’ was not a useful term, and that a better question might be ‘is 
there an identifiable and ongoing risk that means we should disclose?’
150
This raises concerns 
that practitioners may have focused on risk rather than considering the requirements of 
Article 8(2).  Of further concern are clear indications in the assessment that practitioners 
experienced difficulties in ensuring disclosures, and thus interference with P’s article 8 
rights, were proportionate to the risks.  The assessment document notes particularly a lack 
of consistency in the detail disclosed and the types of previous offences disclosed. Given 
suggestions in the assessment that recipients considered more detailed disclosures would be 
helpful, and comments from police officers that they had increasingly disclosed more 
detailed information about P’s previous violent behavior,
151
 it would certainly seem sensible 
for more guidance to be issued, to avoid disproportionate incursions into P’s private life. 
 
One of the primary issues raised by victim’s organisations prior to the pilots was, of course, 
whether the Disclosure Scheme could ever be justified as necessary.
152
  Refuge, for example, 
challenged the assumption that once informed a potential victim would make the choice to 
Yorkshire) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [2012]EWHC 
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be ‘safe’ or indeed, would be able to safely escape the relationship.
 153
  Victims of domestic 
violence who responded to the pre-pilot consultation suggested that if they were told their 
new boyfriend had been violent to a previous girlfriend they would not believe it, they 
would think he would be different with them or that ‘it’s just a jealous ex.’
 154
 Whilst some 
recipients of information under the right to know scheme  were dismissive, or refused to 
listen to disclosure, the assessment suggests that other recipients of disclosures considered 
the information had helped them to make a more informed choice about their 
relationship,
155
 and they would keep a closer eye out for warning signs of domestic abuse in 
their relationship.’
156
  The overall message from the pilot is that the scheme may assist the 
Government to meet its obligations under Articles 2, 3 and 8 (provided effective support is 
provided to victims to help them decide what action to take next).
157
  To ensure, however, 
that the government also complies with its negative obligations under Article 8, further 
guidance about balancing the competing European Convention rights is arguably required. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UK is required to act to prevent domestic violence and to protect victims. The 
introduction of the Disclosure Scheme and of DVPNs clearly demonstrate the Government’s 
commitment to doing so.   
  
The UK is, however, also subject to international obligations, which restrain it from 
interfering in private and family life, unless such interference is necessary and 
proportionate.  Whilst the Government’s guidance on the DVPNs, DVPOs and the Disclosure 
Scheme suggests some consideration has been given to effecting the appropriate balance 
between the rights of victims and perpetrators, it is unfortunate that such limited guidance 
is provided in relation to these rights that practitioners may struggle to effectively balance 
competing rights. That anticipated human rights challenges have not materialised cannot be 
relied upon to demonstrate rights to protection and privacy are being effectively balanced.  
 
It is arguable that further evaluations of both initiatives are warranted to answer numerous 
outstanding questions:  Who is receiving protection from DVPNs and DVPOs (has protection 
been afforded to victims of both physical and non-physical violence in line with the 
requirements of international law abuse)?  Is the harm that may be caused to perpetrators 
and victims by making a DVPO being taken into account by courts?
158
 Are victim’s rights to 
privacy being considered?  Are victims receiving the support they need to obtain maximum 
benefit from DVPNs and DVPOs – in other words are they being empowered to take 
decisions to protect themselves.  Are DVPNs, DVPOs and the Disclosure Scheme protecting 
victims from violence? (If disclosures are not, in fact, resulting in women ending their 
relationships, if DVPOs are doing no more than stopping the violence for 28 days (for it to 
recur immediately thereafter) then questions must be asked about whether disclosures and 
DVPOs can be justified.)   
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 In the meantime, two primary conclusions can be drawn in relation to these initiatives. First, 
support, and consideration for victim autonomy, is essential if these measures are to 
improve the protection afforded to domestic violence victims.  If sufficient support is not 
made available the benefits of these new measures may be limited, and indeed their 
necessity night be questioned. The second, and perhaps most pressing issue if these 
schemes are to be considered human-rights compliant is guidance; practitioners need to be 
able to understand what rights are afforded to victims and perpetrators, and how they can 
be balanced. 
 
